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CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS: AN ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
*

COURTNEY MITCHELL
I
INTRODUCTION

Victims of corporal punishment in public schools have challenged the
infliction of their resulting injuries under a variety of constitutional provisions,
specifically, the Eighth Amendment, the procedural-due-process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the substantive-due-process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and the Fourth Amendment. In Ingraham v. Wright,1 the Supreme
Court foreclosed the Eighth Amendment argument and minimized the
possibilities for a successful procedural-due-process claim.2 Yet because the
Court denied certiorari of the Ingraham plaintiffs’ substantive-due-process
claim,3 later litigants turned to substantive due process for protection against
excessive corporal punishment. With no guidance from the Supreme Court, the
majority of the circuit courts4 confronted with these claims determined that
excessive corporal punishment can violate substantive due process, but only if
the punishment meets an exceptionally high standard.
Recently, in several cases challenging excessive corporal punishment, the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits strayed from the substantive-due-process
framework and evaluated the school officials’ conduct under the Fourth
Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard, which was developed and applied to
the public-school setting in New Jersey v. T.L.O.5 This note will document the
deficiencies of a substantive-due-process challenge to excessive corporal
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1. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
2. Id. at 683.
3. Id. at 679 n.47.
4. Only the First and D.C. Circuits have yet to settle the issue of if and at what point excessive
corporal punishment is constitutionally impermissible.
5. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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punishment and offer support for the emerging Fourth Amendment analysis
that may provide litigants with an infrequently received remedy.
II
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A. Ingraham, the Eighth Amendment, and Procedural Due Process
In 1971, James Ingraham and Roosevelt Andrews, two Florida junior-highschool students, challenged the use of disciplinary corporal punishment in the
Dade County public schools.6 Ingraham was subjected to more than twenty
“licks” with a paddle after he was slow to respond to a teacher’s instructions.7
The beating was so severe that he suffered a hematoma and missed several days
of school after the incident. Andrews was paddled several times, and, after
being struck on his arms, he was unable to use one of his arms for a full week.
Their case challenging corporal punishment, Ingraham v. Wright,8 was
ultimately heard by the United States Supreme Court.9 Noting that the
instances of paddling were “exceptionally harsh,”10 the Court nevertheless
denied the students’ constitutional claims.11 In response to the plaintiffs’ Eighth
Amendment challenge,12 the Court reviewed the Amendment’s historical roots
and determined that its protection was limited to those convicted of crimes;
thus, school children paddled as a means of maintaining discipline could not
avail themselves of Eighth Amendment protection.13 Additionally, the Court
held that the procedural safeguards available under Florida common law14
“considered in light of the openness of the school environment” were sufficient
to afford procedural due process.15 Further procedural safeguards, such as prior
notice or a hearing, were not required by the due-process clause because
“[s]uch a universal constitutional requirement would significantly burden the

6. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 653.
7. Id. at 657.
8. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
9. Id. at 683. The plaintiffs challenged the corporal punishment on Eighth Amendment,
procedural-due-process, and substantive-due-process grounds. See discussion infra II.B.1 for a brief
summary of the distinction between a procedural-due-process challenge and a substantive-due-process
challenge.
10. Id. at 657.
11. Id. at 683.
12. The Eighth Amendment states, “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
13. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
14. Under Florida law, the teacher and the principal must first decide “whether corporal
punishment is reasonably necessary under the circumstances in order to discipline a child who has
misbehaved.” However, the teacher and the principal “must exercise prudence and restraint” because if
the punishment inflicted “is later found to have been excessive—not reasonably believed at the time to
be necessary for the child’s discipline or training—the school authorities inflicting it may be held
liable,” both civilly and criminally. Id. at 676–77.
15. Id. at 678, 682.
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use of corporal punishment as a disciplinary measure.”16 Finally, the Court
denied certiorari on the issue of “whether or under what circumstances” such
punishment of a public-school child could give rise to a substantive-due-process
claim.17 Consequently, the circuit courts were left to resolve this question.
B. Substantive Due Process
1. Substantive Due Process and Section 1983
The Due-Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments provides
that neither the United States nor state governments shall deprive any person
of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”18 This clause imposes
two separate limits on the government: procedural due process and substantive
due process. Procedural due process “refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property.”19 One example of a procedural-due-process issue concerns the type
of notice that is required before a government takes a particular action.20 In
contrast, the substantive component of the due-process clause “asks whether
the government has an adequate reason for taking away a person’s life, liberty,
or property.”21 Thus, substantive due process protects the individual against
arbitrary government action.22 While procedural due process and substantive
due process implicate different concerns and provide different protections, both
are triggered when a denial of life, liberty, or property is at issue.23 In cases
involving corporal punishment in public schools, the child’s liberty interest is
implicated.24
A plaintiff bringing a substantive-due-process challenge must proceed under
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. Section 1983 provides,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
25
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

Section 1983 provides a federal forum to individuals seeking to remedy
violations of the federal Constitution and laws committed under “the claimed

16. Id. at 680.
17. Id. at 679 n.47.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 545 (2006).
20. Id. Thus, in Ingraham, the Court concluded that prior to the imposition of corporal punishment
in the Dade County schools, notice was not required because the “practice [wa]s authorized and limited
by the common law.” Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 682; see discussion supra II.A.
21. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 546.
22. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845 (1998).
23. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 19, at 547.
24. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2008).
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authority of state law.”26 In enacting § 1983, Congress designated the federal
courts as the primary guarantors of civil rights and substantially altered the
relationship between the states and the nation.27 Accordingly, Congress
intended to provide a federal remedy for civil-rights violations regardless of the
state remedies available. “It is no answer that the State has a law which if
enforced would give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state
remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal
one is invoked.”28 Thus, overlapping state remedies are generally irrelevant to
the availability of § 1983. A plaintiff might, for example, bring a § 1983 action
for an unlawful search and seizure, even though the search and seizure violated
the state’s constitution or statutes, and even though common-law remedies
might be available for trespass and conversion.29
2. The “Shock-the-Conscience” Standard
In 1980, in Hall v. Tawney,30 the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit court
to recognize a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a substantive-due-process
violation when a school official abuses his or her official power through the
unauthorized use of force on a public-school child.31 Adopting the standard used
in police-brutality cases, the Fourth Circuit decided that
the substantive due process inquiry in school corporal punishment cases must be
whether the force applied caused injury so severe, was so disproportionate to the need
presented, and was so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or
unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official
32
power literally shocking to the conscience.

Hall became an influential case in the corporal-punishment context. To
date, the Second,33 Third,34 Fourth,35 Sixth,36 Eighth,37 Tenth,38 and Eleventh39
Circuits evaluate public-school corporal-punishment cases under the
substantive-due-process framework and have adopted Hall’s shock-theconscience standard, or something very similar to it.40 The First and D.C.
Circuits have yet to resolve the issue, and the Seventh and Ninth Circuits

26. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972).
27. Id. at 242.
28. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961) (emphasis added), overruled in part not relevant here
by Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658, 664–89 (1978).
29. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 124–35 (1990) (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183).
30. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
31. Id. at 613.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. Sch. Dist., 298 F.3d 168, 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2002).
34. Metzger v. Osbeck, 841 F.2d 518, 520 (3d Cir. 1988).
35. Hall, 621 F.2d at 611.
36. Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir. 1997).
37. Wise v. Pea Ridge Sch. Dist., 855 F.2d 560, 564 (8th Cir. 1988).
38. Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, 817 F.2d 650, 653–54 (10th Cir. 1987).
39. Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton County Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 (11th Cir. 2000).
40. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Ramsey, 121 F. Supp. 2d 911, 918 (E.D. Va. 2000).
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recently shifted from a substantive-due-process analysis to assessment under the
Fourth Amendment.41 The Fifth Circuit remains isolated in its position that
excessive corporal punishment does not violate substantive due process as long
as adequate state remedies are available.42 The Fifth Circuit has consistently
held that “injuries sustained incidental[] to corporal punishment—irrespective
of their severity or the sensitivity of the student—do not implicate the dueprocess clause if the forum state affords adequate post-punishment civil or
criminal remedies for the student to vindicate legal transgressions.”43 The
rationale for this rule is that state criminal and tort remedies provide “all the
process constitutionally due.”44
a. Cases failing to shock the conscience. Several examples illustrate the
application of the shock-the-conscience standard in the various circuit courts.
When a fifth grader sustained “severe bruises on the buttocks and an impaired
gait” after being struck five times with a wooden paddle for humming in the
bathroom, the Sixth Circuit concluded that although the teacher’s conduct was
“unwise,” it was not “shocking to the conscience.”45 Similarly, a nine-year-old
girl who was left “severely bruised” after being struck seven times within thirty
minutes, did not rise to the level of “shocking the conscience,” even though
both a doctor and a policewoman concluded that the blows she received were
excessive.46 Nor was a teacher’s slapping a fourteen-year-old across the face
“shocking to the conscience” even if the slap was “made for no legitimate
purpose.”47 A teacher’s choking of an eighth-grade student “until [he] couldn’t
breath[e],” though “inappropriate” and “untraditional,” did not rise to the level
of a constitutional violation because “the extent of the student’s injury was no
worse than that suffered under more traditional forms of corporal punishment
like paddling . . . .”48 Another court characterized a teacher’s punching an
eighth-grade student in the chest to be “overzealous,” yet the conduct did not
amount to “shocking to the conscience.”49 Nor did a teacher’s jabbing a straight
pin into a child’s arm, requiring the child to seek medical attention, “even
suggest a substantive due process claim.”50

41. See infra II.C.
42. Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 879–80 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J., concurring);
Cunningham v. Beavers, 858 F.2d 269, 272 (5th Cir. 1988).
43. Pruitt v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 136 F.3d 1329, 1329 (5th Cir. 1998).
44. Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 1990). Notably, the Fifth Circuit has not addressed
the adequacy of the alternative state remedies available when denying children’s excessive-corporalpunishment claims. Many of the defendant school districts and school officials may be immune from
suit, likely leaving injured plaintiffs with no remedy at all. See Moore, 233 F.3d at 878 (Wiener, J.,
concurring).
45. Archey v. Hyche, Nos. 90-5631, 90-5863, 1991 WL 100586, at *1, *3 (6th Cir. June 11, 1991).
46. Brown ex rel. Brown v. Johnson, 710 F. Supp. 183, 186–87 (E.D. Ky. 1989).
47. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 719, 726 (6th Cir. 1996).
48. Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1334–35, 1337–38 (11th Cir. 2007).
49. Kurilla v. Callahan, 68 F. Supp. 2d 556, 557, 564 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
50. Brooks v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1535, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1983).
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b. Cases that shock the conscience. The degree of corporal punishment
required to successfully shock the conscience is considerably more brutal. In
Hall, the Fourth Circuit refused to dismiss a child’s substantive-due-process
claim when her complaint alleged that “without apparent provocation” the
teacher struck her with a “homemade paddle, made of hard[,] thick rubber and
about five inches in width . . . across her left hip and thigh.”51 The teacher then
“violently shoved” her against a desk where she was “repeatedly and violently”
paddled.52 As a result of this assault, the child was taken to the emergency room
and admitted into the hospital for ten days to treat the “traumatic injury to the
soft tissue of the left hip and thigh, trauma to the skin and soft tissue of the left
thigh, and trauma to the soft tissue with ecchyniosis of the left buttock.”53 She
also received treatment by specialists for “possible permanent injuries to her
lower back and spine.” She “suffered and [] continue[d] to suffer severe pain
and discomfort.”54
Similarly, in Webb v. McCullough, the Sixth Circuit found that summary
judgment for the defendant principal was “inappropriate” when the principal,
after discovering that the plaintiff and her three roommates had violated the
school rules on a trip, became “quite angry” at the plaintiff’s refusal to let him
into a locked bathroom.55 The principal tried to “jimmy the bathroom door
lock,” but the plaintiff refused to open the door.56 He then “slammed the door
three or four times with his shoulder.”57 When the door finally sprang open, it
knocked the plaintiff against the wall. Then, the principal “thrust the door open
again, and it struck [plaintiff] again, throwing her to the floor.”58 The principal
“grabbed [plaintiff] from the floor, threw her against the wall, and slapped
her.”59 In addressing the plaintiff’s substantive-due-process claim, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that a trier of fact could find that “the alleged blows were a
brutal and inhumane abuse of [the principal’s] official power, literally shocking
to the conscience.”60
In Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera, the Tenth Circuit likewise denied the
defendants’ summary judgment motion after a nine-year-old girl suffered two
beatings at the hands of her school principal and a teacher.61 The teacher held
her “upside down by her ankles while [the principal] struck [her] with a wooden
paddle” five times on the front of her legs.62 When she returned to class, her

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 614 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id.
Id.
Id.
828 F.2d 1151, 1153–54, 1159 (6th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1154.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1159.
817 F.2d 650, 652–53 (10th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 653.
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teacher noticed blood soaking through her clothes and discovered a “welt” and
a “two-inch cut” on her leg that would leave “a permanent scar.”63 The next
school year, the principal again struck the child with the paddle. After receiving
two blows, the principal found it necessary to summon an administrative
associate who “pushed [the child] toward a chair over which she was to bend
and receive three additional blows.” A physician who treated the child
commented, “I’ve done hundreds of physicals of children who have had
spankings . . . and I have not seen bruises on the buttocks as [plaintiff] had,
from routine spankings . . . [T]hey were more extensive, deeper bruises . . . .”64
A nurse who examined her likewise remarked that she “would have called [the
police department’s] Protective Services” had a child received those injuries at
home.65
C. The Fourth Amendment
In 1989, the Supreme Court directed courts to analyze excessive-force
claims under the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard instead of
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive-due-process approach.66
“Because the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit textual source of
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental
conduct, that amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due
process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.”67 In Wallace ex rel.
Wallace v. Batavia School District 101, the Seventh Circuit was the first to apply
the Fourth Amendment’s protection to a teacher’s use of force against a
student.68
In Wallace, a teacher, while trying to break up a fight between Wallace and
another student, grabbed Wallace by the wrist to “speed her exit [from the
classroom],” and when Wallace “bent over the desk,” the teacher “grasped her
right elbow to move her out.”69 Wallace sued the teacher and the school district,
alleging injury to her elbow in violation “of her Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable seizures and her Fourteenth Amendment right to
substantive due process.”70
The Seventh Circuit first noted that although the Fourth Amendment
pertains primarily to the law-enforcement context, the Supreme Court in New
Jersey v. T.L.O.71 had applied its protection to searches of public-school students

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. (bracketed addition in original).
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
Id.
68 F.3d 1010, 1016 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1011.
Id.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
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by school officials, albeit under a different standard.72 In T.L.O., the Court
recognized that due to the school’s “substantial interest” in “maintaining
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds,” a search of a student’s
property would require a lesser degree of suspicion than appropriate in the
criminal context.73 Thus, strict adherence to the probable-cause standard is not
required, and the legality of a search of a public-school student hinges on the
search’s reasonableness.74
Next, the circuit court in Wallace observed that although T.L.O. involved
the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches, several
circuits had applied T.L.O.’s holding to unreasonable seizures of public-school
students.75 Thus, T.L.O.’s reasoning was instructive—the Fourth Amendment
seizure of a public-school student should be examined under the reasonableness
standard “evaluated in the context of the school environment, where restricting
the liberty of students is a sine qua non of the educational process.”76 In
application, the reasonableness test is objective, determining “whether under
the circumstances presented and known the seizure was objectively
unreasonable.”77 The court explained that the reasonableness standard provides
an acceptable middle ground, enabling teachers to deal with disruptive students
while protecting students against the potentially excessive use of state power.78
In applying this standard to the facts of Wallace, the Seventh Circuit held
that the plaintiff did not suffer a constitutional deprivation of her liberty
interest.79 The teacher’s grabbing Wallace’s elbow and wrist in order to expedite
her departure from the classroom during a fight was “hardly . . .
unreasonable.”80
Turning to Wallace’s claim that her Fourteenth Amendment right to
substantive due process was violated by use of excessive corporal punishment,
the Seventh Circuit held that the “Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause [does not] afford[] Wallace any greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment from unwarranted discipline while in school.”81 Excessive corporal
punishment may be assessed under the Fourth Amendment “because a student
is at least as much seized when a school official administers corporal

72. Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1012.
73. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339–40.
74. Id. at 340–41 (holding that Fourth Amendment restrictions placed on searches by public
authorities were unsuitable for searches by school officials and that, consequently, school officials need
not obtain a warrant before conducting a search of a student).
75. Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1012 (citing Edwards ex rel. Edwards v. Rees, 883 F.2d 882, 884 (10th Cir.
1989); Hassan ex rel. Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995)).
76. Id. at 1013–14.
77. Id. at 1014–15.
78. Id. at 1014.
79. Id. at 1015.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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punishment as Wallace was here.”82 Thus both Wallace’s Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims were rejected.
The Ninth Circuit has likewise applied the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness standard to a teacher’s use of force against a public-school
child.83 In Preschooler II vs. Clark County School Board of Trustees, a special
education teacher grabbed the four-year-old disabled plaintiff’s hands and
forced him to slap himself repeatedly in the head and face and slammed him
into a chair.84 The Ninth Circuit found the teacher’s conduct “unreasonable in
light of the child’s age and disability.”85 Furthermore, the court emphasized that
he “posed no danger to anyone nor was he disruptive in the classroom.”86 Thus,
the teacher’s conduct violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
excessive force by public-school teachers.
In 2005, a Tennessee district court also concluded that the Fourth
Amendment could apply to a “school teacher’s use of force or other displays of
disciplinary authority to ‘seize’ her students.”87 The plaintiff, who was assigned
to the special-education classroom, alleged that her teacher had hit her with
“flyswatters, yardsticks, and hands,” had pulled her hair, and had required her
to “drink water from a toilet.”88 The court concluded that the allegations could
“justify a finding that [the teacher] used her official authority to intentionally
acquire physical and disciplinary control over [the plaintiff] in a manner that
was objectively unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.89
III
ANALYSIS
Because Ingraham foreclosed an Eighth Amendment challenge to excessive
corporal punishment and severely limited the possibility of a successful
procedural-due-process challenge, litigants turned to substantive due process
for protection. However, the adoption and frequent misapplication of the
rigorous shock-the-conscience standard, combined with judicial hostility toward
§ 1983 and criticism of the “amorphous”90 nature of the substantive-due-process
clause, left many deserving children without a constitutional remedy. Yet the
recent application of the Fourth Amendment to excessive-corporal-punishment
challenges may provide victims with a reliable constitutional remedy.

82. Id. at 1016 (emphasis added).
83. Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007); see also
Doe ex rel. Doe v. State of Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 908–09 (9th Cir. 2003).
84. 479 F.3d at 1178.
85. Id. at 1180.
86. Id.
87. Rhodes ex rel. Rhodes v. Wallace, No. 1:05 CV 1020, 2005 WL 2114080, at *6 (W.D. Tenn.
Aug. 26, 2005).
88. Id. at *1.
89. Id. at *6.
90. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994).
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A. Prisoners and Children: Unlikely Counterparts
Subsequent to the Fourth Circuit’s Hall decision, most of the circuits
confronted with substantive-due-process challenges to excessive-corporalpunishment cases adopted Hall’s shock-the-conscience standard—that is,
excessive corporal punishment violates substantive due process only when the
official’s conduct shocks the conscience. The Fourth Circuit’s unexplained
choice to analogize corporal punishment in public schools to such incidents as
the forcible use of a stomach pump,91 an officer’s “reckless” shooting of a
suspect,92 and the unprovoked beating of a detainee by a prison guard93 was
particularly surprising since the Supreme Court, in refusing to extend Eighth
Amendment protection to the public-school context in Ingraham, had gone to
great lengths to emphasize the differences between prisoners and school
children.94 The Court had explained, “[t]he prisoner and the schoolchild stand in
wholly different circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal
conviction and incarceration.”95
Since the Ingraham decision, the Supreme Court has continued to stress the
substantial differences between prisoners and public-school students. In New
Jersey v. T.L.O.,96 the Court stated that they were “not yet ready to hold that
the schools and the prisons need be equated for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.”97 After recognizing that the Fourth Amendment principles
developed in law-enforcement cases were unworkable in the school arena, the
Court created a new reasonableness standard for searches of public-school
students by school officials.98
Other courts, recognizing the drastic disparity between public-school
children and prisoners, have similarly refused to apply the same standard to
such different populations. In Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia School District
101,99 the Seventh Circuit noted the difficulties in applying the Fourth
Amendment framework developed in the law-enforcement context to the
public-school environment because of the stark differences between the two
fields.100
Deprivations of liberty in schools serve the end of compulsory education and do not
inherently pose constitutional problems.
This premise of a general constitutionally permissible liberty restriction is, of course,
not the case in the law enforcement context. Seizures of individuals by police are

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 206 (1952).
Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228, 1231–32 (4th Cir. 1970).
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029–30 (2d Cir. 1973).
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669–70 (1977).
Id. at 669.
469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id. at 338–39.
Id. at 339–42; see discussion supra II.C.
68 F.3d 1010 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1014.
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premised on society’s need to apprehend and punish violators of the law. As such,
they inherently threaten individuals’ liberty to live free of the criminal justice process.
There is no analogous liberty for students to live free of the educational process.

...
There is little parallel . . . between the school and law enforcement situations when
there is a seizure of the person. The basic purpose for the deprivation of a student’s
personal liberty by a teacher is education, while the basic purpose for the deprivation
of liberty of a criminal suspect by a police officer is investigation or apprehension. The
101
application of the Fourth Amendment is necessarily different in these situations.

Thus, the circuit courts in both T.L.O. and Wallace recognized that the
disparity between public education and law enforcement was too great to justify
blind application of the same analytical framework. Although Hall predates
both T.L.O. and Wallace, acknowledging the differences between public-school
children and prisoners in constitutional analysis is hardly novel. But the Fourth
Circuit’s adoption of the strict police-brutality standard for substantive-dueprocess challenges to disciplinary corporal punishment guaranteed that very few
of those claims would succeed.
B. Hostility Surrounding § 1983 and Substantive Due Process
The considerable inconsistencies among courts evaluating § 1983 excessivecorporal-punishment claims may be a product of the unwillingness of some
judges to “constitutionalize” these seemingly state-law torts. Section 1983 is
frequently criticized as a vehicle for bringing frivolous claims, and,
consequently, it is cited as a source of the mounting pressure on the federal
docket.102
Additionally, federal judges may feel uneasy “about the prospect of federal
courts sitting in judgment of state officials or implementing decrees compelling
state officials to take or refrain from certain actions.”103 This concern has been
expressed repeatedly by judges unwilling to pass judgment on the actions of
school officials.104
A third popular criticism of § 1983 is what it implies for federalism values—
specifically, the erosion of state lawmaking authority.105 Because a § 1983 action
101. Id.
102. Michael G. Collins, ‘Economic Rights,’ Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section
1983, 77 GEO. L.J. 1493, 1493 (1989); Henry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of
Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985).
103. Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1057,
1073 (1989).
104. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (“[E]ducation . . . is
primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal
judges.”); Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 809 (5th Cir. 1990) (avoiding “having student discipline, a
matter of public policy, shaped by the individual predilections of federal jurists rather than by state
lawmakers and local officials”).
105. See, e.g., Blackmun, supra note 102, at 2 (noting increasing condemnation of § 1983 actions as
“inconsistent with the thesis that federal courts not interfere with state affairs unless absolutely
necessary”); Herman, supra note 103, at 1073 (“[F]ederal court adjudication of section 1983 claims is
frequently seen as potentially or actually intrusive upon the states’ power.”); Christina Whitman,
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is frequently redundant of a state tort suit, dismissing the federal cause of action
may be an attractive option for a federal court and a signal to future litigants to
pursue these claims under state law (hence, presumably in state court). This is
seemingly the approach the Fifth Circuit has adopted.106
Furthermore, substantive due process is often denounced as being
“amorphous and imprecise,”107 composed of vague standards that permit
irresponsible decisionmaking.108 Likewise, the shock-the-conscience standard is
notoriously ambiguous and difficult to apply.109 “Because [the shock-theconscience standard] is so subjective, its application will change as one federal
judge after another struggles to apply it.”110 As described by Justice Douglas in
his concurring opinion in Rochin v. California,111 “the rule turn[s] not on the
Constitution but on the idiosyncrasies of the judges who sit here.”112
Consequently, criticism surrounding § 1983, together with the vague notion
of substantive due process and the haphazard application of the shock-theconscience standard, shrink the success rate of substantive-due-process
challenges to excessive corporal punishment.113
C. The Misapplication of the Shock-the-Conscience Standard
1. An Arbitrary Comparative Exercise
Although Hall’s shock-the-conscience standard calls for balancing the
severity of the injury with the need presented, courts tend to focus only on the
severity of the plaintiff’s injury. Thus, courts are simply comparing the
seriousness of the beatings with those suffered by previous plaintiffs. Due to the
“unduly restrictive standard”114 adopted by the circuits, this comparative
exercise results in successful constitutional claims for only the most viciously
attacked children.
Notably, several courts have used the punishment inflicted in Ingraham, in
which one child was held over a table and struck more than twenty times with a
two-foot long wooden paddle, as a benchmark in determining whether certain
punitive conduct is shocking to the conscience.115 Doing so is clearly incorrect,
Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 30 (1980) (arguing that actions under § 1983 actions “results
inevitably in the displacement of state lawmaking authority by the federal government”).
106. See Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804, 808 (5th Cir. 1990).
107. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994).
108. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).
109. Radecki v. Barela, 945 F. Supp. 226, 230 (D.N.M. 1996).
110. Id.
111. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
112. Id. at 179 (Douglas, J. concurring).
113. See cases cited supra II.B.2.a.
114. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power through Substantive Due
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 575 (2008).
115. Brooks v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond, 569 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1983) (“[T]wenty licks with
a two-foot-long paddle causing a severe hematoma and loss of the use of an arm for a week did not
shock the conscience of the United States Supreme Court in Ingraham.”); see also Brown ex rel. Brown
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for in Ingraham the Supreme Court addressed neither a substantive-dueprocess standard nor whether the punishment was shocking to the conscience.116
The Fifth Circuit in Ingraham—without employing a shock-the-conscience
standard—had concluded that the plaintiffs were not deprived of their
substantive-due-process rights,117 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on
that issue.118 So one cannot conclude that the Court agreed with the Fifth
Circuit’s analysis.119 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has recognized that a district court
comparing corporal-punishment facts to those in Ingraham erred in doing so:
[T]he court [in Brown v. Johnson] repeatedly suggested that in Ingraham v. Wright
“the Supreme Court found that a severe beating [20 licks with a paddle] and the
resulting hematoma [which required the plaintiff to miss 11 days of school] did not
shock its conscience.” [T]he Brown court’s reading of Ingraham v. Wright seems
incorrect; the Supreme Court did not address the “conscience shocking” question in
120
Ingraham.

Although comparison to the facts of Ingraham may be inappropriate, courts
nevertheless continue to use the facts of the few cases that have managed to
“shock the conscience” as a benchmark for measuring the brutality of the
punishment in a case before them. Three cases that often serve as the standard
to which courts judge the seriousness of a plaintiff’s injury, Hall v. Tawney,121
Webb v. McCullough,122 and Garcia ex rel. Garcia v. Miera,123 are examples of the
level of egregiousness required to sufficiently shock a court’s conscience.124
Using the extreme cases of Hall, Webb, and Garcia as benchmarks for when
a school official’s conduct shocks the conscience leaves children suffering severe
injury at the hands of overzealous school officials without a cognizable
substantive-due-process claim because they were not treated “as brutally.”125 In
Darden ex rel. Darden v. Watkins, the plaintiff’s fourth-grade homeroom
teacher paddled him for failing to turn in a homework assignment.126 When the
child told the teacher he could not find his homework, the teacher brought him

v. Johnson, 710 F. Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Ky. 1989) (characterizing plaintiff’s injury as “much milder”
than the “severe beating” that did not shock the conscience in Ingraham); Honaker v. Beverage, No.
87-13, 1989 WL 517, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 4, 1989) (“In Ingraham, the Supreme Court found that a
severe beating and the resulting hematoma did not shock its conscience. In this case, [the teacher’s]
conduct is much milder.”).
116. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 689 n.5 (1977) (White, J., dissenting).
117. See Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 917 (5th Cir. 1976), aff’d, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
118. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. at 689 n.5 (White, J., dissenting).
119. NLRB v. Lannom Mfg. Co., 243 F.2d 304, 307 (6th Cir. 1957) (“Having in mind the oft
repeated admonition that denial of certiorari is not to be considered as an affirmance of the ruling on
the merits . . .”).
120. Saylor v. Bd. of Educ. 118 F.3d 507, 513 n.9 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Brown v. Johnson, 710 F.
Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Ky. 1989)) (internal citation omitted) (bracketed addition in original).
121. 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980).
122. 828 F.2d 1151 (6th Cir. 1987).
123. 817 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1987).
124. See discussion supra II.B.2.b.
125. Darden ex rel. Darden v. Watkins, No. 87-5331, 1988 WL 40083, at *5 (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 1988).
126. Id. at *1–2.

MITCHELL

334

10/12/2010 11:56:53 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 73:321

up to the front of the classroom, bent him over his own desk, and struck him.127
He cried and returned to his desk. The child testified that the teacher then
brought him up to the front of the classroom again and “gave me another lick
and he hit me so hard he hurt my leg and I limped and bumped my back and I
begged him not to hit me anymore, and he hit me again.”128 Later that evening,
the child’s mother discovered the bruises and took him to the emergency room
where the physician observed “a three-to-four-inch area of reddish-blue
discoloration over the fleshy part of plaintiff’s left buttock.”129 In holding that
the district court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the substantive-due-process issue, the Sixth Circuit explained that
“the events of the present case are easily distinguishable from both Hall and
Webb by comparison to the level of force . . . inflicted upon plaintiff.”130
Although the teacher’s paddling of the child may have been “unwise,” the court
conceded, the child had not been “treated as brutally as were the plaintiffs in
Hall and Webb.”131
Similarly, a Pennsylvania district court dismissed a child’s substantive-dueprocess claim after his history teacher, whose breath smelled of alcohol,
“forcefully punched” him “with a closed fist” in his upper chest for failing to
turn in a homework assignment.132 The teacher punched the child so hard “that
the [other] students were able to hear the impact [of the blow] from their
seats.”133 The court reasoned that the use of force in Webb had been “far more
severe, and sustained for a longer time, than in the instant case.”134
Furthermore, a Kentucky district court dismissed a middle-school specialeducation student’s substantive-due-process claim after she was struck three
times with a twenty-inch long paddle.135 The twelve-year-old, who had an I.Q. of
forty-two, was “emotionally out of control” when the principal administered the
first paddling.136 After the blow, she ran across the room, and when the principal
attempted to strike her again, she covered her buttocks with her hands. Two
teachers took each one of her hands and held them on the desk as the principal
paddled her two more times. Later that day, the child complained to her father
that her backside hurt and the father observed a “blood red [welt] across both
cheeks of her butt.”137 Her father took her to the Kentucky Cabinet for Health
and Family Services; an investigator took pictures of her injuries and concluded
that abuse had occurred. A criminal charge against the principal was presented
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Thomas v. Bd. of Educ. 467 F. Supp. 2d 483, 487 (W.D. Pa. 2006).
Id.
Id. at 490.
C.A. ex rel. G.A. v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 577 F. Supp. 2d 886, 888 (E.D. Ky. 2008).
Id.
Id. at 889.
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to the grand jury. Still, in the child’s suit under § 1983, the court held that the
principal’s conduct did not shock the conscience and distinguished the
allegations in Garcia and Hall as “significantly more serious than those in this
case.”138
By simply comparing a present plaintiff’s injury with those suffered by the
plaintiffs in the extreme cases of Hall, Webb, and Garcia, courts are arbitrarily
denying constitutional protection to many deserving children.
2. Misapplication of the Hall Standard
Hall’s shock-the-conscience standard requires balancing the severity of the
inflicted injury with the need presented.139 By focusing merely on the seriousness
of the harm inflicted, courts are completely ignoring the second part of the
equation-analysis of the circumstances prompting the punishment.
For example, in Archey v. Hyche, the Sixth Circuit denied the plaintiff’s
substantive-due-process claim as not “shocking to the conscience” because the
plaintiff “received [only] five ‘licks’” and the teacher was “working in a school
context with a legitimate purpose for administering the paddlings.”140 The court
concluded simply that the plaintiff’s allegation did not “describe excessive force
at the level of brutality required”141 without having considered whether it “was
so disproportionate to the need presented.”142 The Sixth Circuit overlooked the
fact that the supposed offense that triggered such punishment was merely
“humming in the boys’ bathroom.”143 Considering the nature of the plaintiff’s
offense in relation to his punishment, it is only reasonable to conclude that the
need for punishment presented by a fifth-grade child humming in the bathroom
is minimal. If the need for punishment presented by the offense is negligible,
nearly any degree of corporal punishment will be “disproportionate to the need
presented.”144 If the Sixth Circuit had properly employed the Hall standard, it
would have concluded that administering five “licks” with a wooden paddle145
was “so disproportionate to the need [for punishment] presented”146 by a child
humming in the bathroom147 that it would have “amounted to a brutal and
inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.”148
Other courts employing the shock-the-conscience standard have similarly
failed to assign proper weight to the need-for-application-of-force factor, some

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 892–93.
Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 1980).
Nos. 90-5631, 90-5863, 1991 WL 100586, at *3 (6th Cir. June 11, 1991).
Id.
Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.
Archey, 1991 WL 100586, at *1.
Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.
Archey, 1991 WL 100586, at *1, *3.
Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.
Archey, 1991 WL 100586, at *1.
Hall, 621 F.2d at 613.
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even opining that hitting or slapping a child “for no legitimate purpose”149 does
not violate the child’s constitutional rights. By ignoring the “need presented”
prong of the Hall test, a court examining a substantive-due-process claim for
excessive corporal punishment is left comparing the severity of a particular
plaintiff’s beating with that of a previous plaintiff. A court merely assessing the
level of brutality inflicted is not functioning as a court charged with evaluating a
substantive-due-process claim, but is rather functioning as a trial court charged
with resolving a state-law tort claim.150
D. A Solution in the Fourth Amendment
Because courts are misusing the shock-the-conscience standard, the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness standard may be a better fit for courts analyzing
excessive-corporal-punishment cases. Both the Seventh151 and Ninth152 Circuits
have embraced the use of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test in
excessive-corporal-punishment cases.
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the publicschool arena recognizes that because the school setting “requires some
modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a
search,” a standard of reasonableness is more appropriate than the typical
probable-cause standard available in other contexts.153 T.L.O. counsels that in
order for a search to be acceptable, it must be “reasonably related in scope to
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place”:154 the scope
of the search is acceptable when it is “not excessively intrusive in light of the
age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”155
In a footnote to T.L.O., the Supreme Court suggested that its reference to
“the nature of the infraction” did not suggest that judges should evaluate “the
relative importance of various school rules.”156 Yet in the Supreme Court’s most
recent public-school Fourth Amendment case, Safford Unified School District
No. 1 v. Redding,157 the Court went to great lengths to assess the gravity of the

149. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996); see also, e.g., Gonzales
ex rel. Gonzales v. Passino, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1277, 1282 (D.N.M. 2002).
150. See Archey, 1991 WL 100586, at *3 (emphasizing that the resolution of a state tort claim “may
well turn on whether ‘ten licks rather than five’ were excessive” but the resolution of a substantive-dueprocess claim is “of so different an order of magnitude that [it] simply need not start at the level of
concern these distinctions imply) (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613).
151. See Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia School Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a teacher who grabbed the plaintiff’s elbow and wrist in order to hasten her departure
from the classroom following a fight did not unreasonably seize the plaintiff under the Fourth
Amendment).
152. See P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1303 n.4, 1304 (9th Cir. 1996) (suggesting that students are
protected from excessive force under either the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process clause).
153. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985).
154. Id. at 341.
155. Id. at 342 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 342 n.9.
157. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
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plaintiff’s infraction. In Safford, an administrative assistant and the school nurse
conducted a strip-search of a thirteen-year-old girl suspected of bringing
prescription and over-the-counter drugs into school.158 The school’s policy
prohibited “the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on school
grounds, including ‘[a]ny prescription or over-the-counter drug.’”159 The
assistant principal had received reports that the plaintiff was providing fellow
students with prescription and over-the-counter pain-relief pills; he found
several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a cigarette in the plaintiff’s
day planner.160 When the plaintiff denied knowledge of pills confiscated from
another student, the assistant principal directed an administrative assistant to
take the plaintiff to the nurse’s office so she could be strip-searched for pills.161
In declaring this strip-search unreasonable, the Court highlighted the
“nature and limited threat of the specific drugs,” and described the drugs as
“nondangerous school contraband.”162 Furthermore, the Court declared that the
facts lacked “any indication of danger to the students from the power of the
[plaintiff’s] drugs or their quantity.”163 If the Court is willing to discriminate
between types of drugs according to their “nature” and “threat” level, as well as
to distinguish between dangerous and nondangerous contraband, the Court is
clearly willing to evaluate “the relative importance of various school rules.”164
Under a Fourth Amendment analysis, then, courts can assign what they
consider a proper weight to the magnitude of a student’s wrongdoing.
Excessive-corporal-punishment cases should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment’s reasonableness standard, in which consideration of the nature of
the triggering infraction has historically been an important part of the analysis.165
Both circuits that have used the Fourth Amendment to analyze excessivecorporal-punishment cases have properly balanced the nature and
circumstances of the student’s infraction with the severity of the punishment
inflicted. In Wallace, the Seventh Circuit held that the teacher’s action in
grabbing the plaintiff’s elbow and wrist to force her out of the classroom was
reasonable because the teacher was attempting to break up a fight between the
plaintiff and another student.166 In P.B. v. Koch, the Ninth Circuit held a
principal’s conduct unreasonable because “there was no need for force” when

158. Id. at 2638.
159. Id. at 2639–40.
160. Id. at 2640.
161. Id. at 2640–41.
162. Id. at 2642.
163. Id. at 2642–43.
164. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.9.
165. E.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995); Gray ex rel. Alexander v.
Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2006); Bell v. Marseilles Elementary Sch., 160 F. Supp. 2d 883,
889 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Kennedy v. Dexter Consol. Sch., 10 P.3d 115, 122 (D. N.M. 2000).
166. Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Batavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1995).
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he hit a fifteen-year-old student across the face and squeezed the student’s neck
after hearing the student utter the words “Heil Hitler.”167
When the need for the corporal punishment imposed is properly considered,
an offense implicating the safety of students or teachers presents a greater need
for punishment than a nonthreatening offense. For example, under the Fourth
Amendment analysis, the teacher in Wallace acted reasonably when he grabbed
the plaintiff in order to deflate a violent situation,168 whereas the principal in
Koch acted unreasonably when he slapped and squeezed the plaintiff in
response to a nonviolent one.169 Similarly, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. State of Hawaii
Department of Education, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because the eightyear-old plaintiff’s “only offense” was “‘horsing around’ and refusing to stand
still” and because there was “no indication that [the plaintiff] was fighting or
that he posed a danger to other students,” the teacher’s conduct in taping his
head to a tree for five minutes was “objectively unreasonable in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.”170
In responding to an imminent, violent threat, a school official must
immediately act to resolve the conflict. The immediacy of the situation does not
permit the official to carefully consider the most appropriate punishment,
whereas an official responding to a nonviolent offense, for example, a child
humming in the bathroom, can reflect on the appropriateness of a certain
punishment. Because courts are reluctant to judge the actions of state officials,171
taking the nature of the threat presented into account allows courts to
acknowledge the gravity of an emergency encounter while protecting children
from overzealous officials.
Finally, analyzing excessive-corporal-punishment cases under the Fourth
Amendment will allow the Fifth Circuit to retreat from its isolated position
without having to disrupt its strict rule of stare decisis.172 In fact, the Fifth Circuit
has already concluded that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable seizures protects students from improper disciplinary actions.173
Additionally, when it was confronted with a case alleging excessive corporal
punishment in violation of both the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth
Amendment substantive-due-process clause, the court noted that because it did
not find a constitutional violation under either standard, there was “no occasion
to address . . . whether, under Graham, . . . the Fourth Amendment, rather than

167. 96 F.3d 1298, 1299–1300, 1303 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996).
168. Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1015.
169. Koch, 96 F.3d at 1299–1300, 1303 n.4.
170. 334 F.3d 906, 909–10 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Preschooler II v. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs.,
479 F.3d 1175, 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the teacher’s slapping the four-year-old disabled
plaintiff was unreasonable because he “posed no danger to anyone nor was he disruptive in the
classroom”) (emphasis added).
171. See discussion supra III.B.
172. See Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 876–77 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J.,
concurring).
173. See Hassan ex rel. Hassan v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 55 F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1995).
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the Due Process Clause, protects a student from the use of excessive force.”174
Thus, a public-school student in the Fifth Circuit who brings an excessive-force
claim under the Fourth Amendment might avoid the long line of unfavorable
substantive-due-process precedent in that circuit and find redress in a Fourth
Amendment challenge.
Admittedly, the Fourth Amendment and excessive-corporal-punishment
cases are not a perfect fit; courts so noting cite the amendment’s historical
application to law-enforcement cases.175 The two circuits that have analyzed
excessive-corporal-punishment cases under the Fourth Amendment disagree as
to whether the Fourth Amendment will always be available to redress these
injuries. The Ninth Circuit noted that there may be instances in which a teacher
uses excessive force against a student without “seizing or searching” the
student—rendering the Fourth Amendment inapplicable.176 In contrast, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause a student is at least as much seized
when a school official administers corporal punishment,” the Fourth
Amendment is clearly the proper vehicle to address these excessive-force
claims.177
Unlike substantive due process, the Fourth Amendment provides an explicit
textual source of constitutional protection and has a strong historical
foundation in the public-school context. The widespread acceptance of a publicschool student’s Fourth Amendment rights, in which a search or seizure is
analyzed “in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the
infraction,”178 provides courts with a sound analytical framework and may supply
the victims of excessive corporal punishment with an infrequently received
remedy.
E. Retreat from the Corporal-Punishment “Norm”
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.179 Thirty-three years ago, at the time of
the Ingraham decision, the administration of corporal punishment was more
socially acceptable—that is, more reasonable—than it is today. For example, in
Ingraham, the Court noted that its analysis was set “[a]gainst [a] background of
historical and contemporary approval of reasonable corporal punishment.”180
The Court noted that only two states, Massachusetts and New Jersey, had

174. Campbell v. McAlister, No. 97-20675, 1998 WL 770706, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 20, 1998) (quoting
P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1030 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996)).
175. See Gottlieb ex rel. Calabria v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2001); see
also Wallace ex rel. Wallace v. Battavia Sch. Dist. 101, 68 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 1995).
176. Clark County Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d at 1181 n.5.
177. See Wallace, 68 F.3d at 1016 (emphasis added).
178. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (emphasis added).
179. E.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001).
180. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 663 (1977).
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wholly prohibited the use of corporal punishment in public schools.181
Conversely, according to statistics from the 2006–2007 school year released by
the United States Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights, twentynine states (plus the District of Columbia) have banned the use of corporal
punishment in public schools.182 Additionally, the number of students corporally
punished in the United States has declined from 1,521,896 in 1976 to 223,190 in
2006—an eighty-five-percent decrease.183 Notably, only a handful of states were
responsible for the bulk of the punishments in 2006.184 Because the central
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, society’s diminished
tolerance of corporal punishment in our public schools will be a significant
factor in the Fourth Amendment analysis.
IV
CONCLUSION
The historical justifications for permitting corporal punishment seemingly
no longer hold much weight. While incidences of corporal punishment are
decreasing, they are hardly a problem of the past. Thus, some adjustment in the
constitutional analysis of these claims is necessary because many children are
suffering at the hands of overzealous school officials without a federal remedy.
So long as judicial hostility to § 1983 remains, plaintiffs may find more
receptiveness under the Fourth Amendment because it offers an explicit textual
source of constitutional protection, rather than the “amorphous and
imprecise”185 nature of the shock-the-conscience inquiry. Additionally, the
Fourth Amendment has strong support in the public-school context, recently
reaffirmed in Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding,186 unlike the
“indefinite and vague”187 character of substantive due process.
The Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard instructs courts to
evaluate the search or seizure in light of the child’s age, sex, and the nature of
the triggering infraction.188 These considerations provide judges more flexibility
to distinguish between official action executed in a dangerous situation and
action executed after further reflection. Although the shock-the-conscience test
of substantive due process calls for an analysis of the need for the punishment
presented, courts have neglected to engage in this scrutiny and have instead

181. Id.
182. The Center for Effective Discipline, available at http://www.stophitting.com/index.ph
p?page=statesbanning (last visited July 1, 2009).
183. Id.
184. Rick Lyman, In Many Public Schools, the Paddle is No Relic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006
(noting that in 2002, nearly three-quarters of all corporal punishment in the United States took place in
Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee and Alabama).
185. Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296, 1308 (3d Cir. 1994).
186. 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
187. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
188. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985).
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fixated on how badly a child was beaten—regardless of his or her alleged
offense—resulting in only the severest beatings’ succeeding to shock the
conscience. At a minimum, the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the publicschool context instructs that, though this environment warrants a high degree of
judicial deference to school officials, there are still limits, and the degree of
intrusion on a child’s liberty must correspond with the nature of the child’s
infraction.

